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The Natal Indian Congress, the Mass
Democratic Movement and the
Struggle to Defeat Apartheid:
1980–1994
ASHWIN DESAI∗ AND GOOLAM VAHED∗∗
ABSTRACT The Natal Indian Congress (NIC) was revived in 1971 in the context of
what has become known as the ‘Durban moment’. This period also witnessed the
emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement and an independent trade union
movement inspired by the 1973 Durban strikes. Despite a government crackdown
and opposition from anti-apartheid groups that asserted that ethnic identities
were a relic of the past, the NIC attracted younger activists through the 1970s
and by the early 1980s, had survived the banning and detention of its
leadership to become involved in civic struggles over housing and education,
and in mobilizing against government-created political structures. It also
played a pivotal role in the United Democratic Front formed in 1983. This did
not mean that the NIC was monolithic. The 1980s spawned vibrant and often
vicious debates within the NIC over participation in government-created
structures, allegations of cabals and, as democracy dawned, differing opinions
of the future of an organization that first came into being in the last decade of
the nineteenth century. In critically interrogating this crucial period between
1980 and 1994, when mass-based struggle was renewed, two states of
emergency were imposed and apartheid eventually ended, this article adds to
the growing historiography of the anti-apartheid struggle by focusing on an
important but neglected aspect of that story. It focuses on the internal workings
of the NIC and the relationship between the NIC, the emergent Mass
Democratic Movement and the African National Congress (ANC) in the context
of broader political and economic changes.
Introduction
The 1970s witnessed a revival of political mobilization by internal anti-apartheid
forces in South Africa. The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), led by Steve
Biko, inspired a groundswell of student activism on Black campuses. It was
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pioneering in that it sought to bring Africans, Coloureds and Indians into one pol-
itical unit under an overarching singular identity of Black. In the midst of the rise
of the BCM the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) was revived, while an independent
Black trade union movement emerged in the aftermath of the 1973 Durban strikes.
Together, this confluence of influences has come to be known as the ‘Durban
moment’ (Keniston 2013). As the 1970s unfolded, the BCM was hounded by
bans and imprisonment and, tragically, Biko died in police custody. The trade
union movement was more cautious in its political approach, while continuing
to make gains on the shopfloor. The 1970s were a period of consolidation for
the NIC which survived the banning of many of its leaders and accusations
by the BCM that it was an ethnic body fitting into the logic of apartheid, to
enter the 1980s with its organization relatively intact (Vahed and Desai 2014).
In the revived NIC of the 1970s, people such as Mewa Ramgobin, George Sew-
persadh, and subsequently Pravin Gordhan and Zac Yacoob, all professionals,
came to the fore. The NIC initially concentrated on ‘bread and butter’ issues, par-
ticularly housing and education, through civic organizations. It gained momentum
in the early 1980s with campaigns such as the Release Mandela Campaign (RMC,
1980), the anti-South African Indian Council (SAIC) campaign (1981), and the
national education boycott of 1980, which radicalized many students, some of
whom subsequently found a political home in NIC structures. For most of the
1970s, professionals led the NIC. This began to change from the late 1970s
when a younger generation of ‘home grown’ civic activists and students began
to take up leadership roles within the NIC. Many were involved in youth organ-
izations, trades unions or the BCM and helped to widen the concerns of the
NIC and in the process of mobilizing the masses.
This article examines the trajectory of the NIC from 1980 to 1994, a period
that witnessed sustained anti-apartheid mobilization, two states of emergency,
the unbanning of the liberation movements, the release of Nelson Mandela
and negotiations that led to the country’s first democratic elections. This is an
important story of how an organization founded by the apostle of non-violence,
Mohandas K. Gandhi in 1894 and which continued to pay homage to him, har-
boured Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) fighters who were committed to armed
struggle; and, which survived divisive debates over participation in govern-
ment-created structures to become an inspiring force in the United Democratic
Front (UDF). The key question is whether the NIC was able to capture the
imagination of the Indian masses to the extent that they embraced its mother
body, the ANC, during the 1994 elections and if not, why not? In addressing
these questions, this article adds to the historiography of the anti-apartheid
struggle by developing a better understanding of the internal workings of the
NIC as well its relationship with the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), the
ANC and its appeal in the Indian community. The article relies on contemporary
newspaper reports as well as interviews with activists conducted at different
times by different people. While we are aware that such material has to be
treated with care as oral testimony can be problematic, particularly in areas
that are so ideologically contested, we have sought to mitigate this by relying
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on a diverse range of voices as well as recent academic research in the form of
articles and dissertations.
Into the 1980s
Between the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Mass Democratic Movement’s (MDM) defiance
campaign of 1989, a long wave of popular protest surged across the South African political
landscape. It eroded familiar landmarks and opened new channels, it lapped on the beach-
heads of white power, and its high tide left a residue of aspirations and expectations.
(Bundy 2000, 26)
In the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto Rebellion, the state adopted a series of repres-
sive measures to quell the ongoing protest. While this had important effects like
eroding the power of the BCM, the state failed to gain control of Black townships,
while the labour movement continued to make gains across the country.
By the early 1980s, the National Party (NP) government was facing a mounting
economic crisis. On the political front, the international anti-apartheid movement
had grown in power and the ANC became a more effective organization with a
presence in many countries around the world. Internally, 1980 was greeted with
a massive education boycott, which ushered a new cycle of youth activism (see
Seekings 1993). The protests began in the Cape in April 1980 against the third-
class status of Black education and spread rapidly across the country. The Univer-
sity of Durban-Westville (UD-W), Springfield College of Education, M. L. Sultan
Technikon and many schools in Natal joined the boycott. The NIC forged links
with student leaders and community organizations. The state responded by detain-
ing activists, including NIC leaders and students. Yunus Shaik, a student at UD-
W, was detained for almost 10 months with NIC leaders such as Thumba Pillay,
Farouk Meer and M. J. Naidoo at Modderbee in Benoni. Shaik described this as an
important moment in intergenerational politics:
That was a difficult experience because you really didn’t know whether you were going to be
released, whether you’ll sit for the exams, don’t sit for the exams. But it was good because
my political education underwent a qualitative transformation. I had an older generation
there who shared with us an entire nation’s history of struggle. I got to locate the struggles
we were in at the time to the struggles that went before. I also got exposed to different pol-
itical thoughts. There was not much written literature to tell you who the ANC was and what
their programme was. You didn’t even have a copy of the Freedom Charter. So it was an oral
history that had to be handed down. This intergenerational contact meant that we could start
raising community issues and engaging in community struggles, so you take the struggle out
of the university into the communities. We had the energy for that as youngsters and take
guidance out of an older generation. That connection began to impact on us. And we
fanned out across the community but we focused on working-class communities in particu-
lar. We became alive to the fact that the heart of the struggle could not be located on the
middle-class and the intelligentsia.
Thus a new layer of activists broadened out from their university bases and
became involved in community struggles.
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Grassroots politics
A main avenue of protest in the late 1970s was civic organizations that emerged to
take up struggles around high rents and transportation costs, poor living conditions
and lack of amenities. The NIC, Democratic Lawyers Association and Anti-SAIC
Committee were central to these struggles through the 1980s (see Seekings
2000a). In most ‘units’ of Chatsworth, for example, residents formed housing
associations to take up struggles for housing and amenities. They coordinated
their struggles through the Chatsworth Housing Action Committee (CHAC)
which was formed to oppose the 15% rent increase announced by the Durban
City Council in January 1980. George Sewpersadh and Farouk Meer of the NIC
were members of CHAC (Post, February 13, 1980). Other NIC members were
active in these struggles in Phoenix. Yusuf Vawda notes that the NIC got involved
when the residents of Tin Town in Springfield were affected by floods and were
moved to Phoenix:
It became evident that they were getting these blockhouses which were hardly comfortable
or even good from a health standard. As people moved in, they encountered numerous pro-
blems. These houses were barely shells. The facilities were non-existent. There were no real
roads there so you had to trudge through mud to get to your house if it rained. There were no
telephones and certainly no recreational amenities. Schools were starting to go up [but] the
people were still commuting to the old schools they were going to. That became a fairly big
preoccupation with many of us and in the course of interacting with people in that new settle-
ment we became involved in establishing mainly community-based organisations to cam-
paign and work around people’s civic demands. The big break was the establishment of
the Phoenix Working Committee which was the umbrella organisation of the Phoenix com-
munity to campaign against the Government and the City Council. So those became some
sort of big campaigns.
While Phoenix to the north and Chatsworth to the south of Durban were estab-
lished as ‘Indian’ townships, the latter was established in the early 1960s and
the former in the mid-1970s. There was thus a significant gap in terms of infra-
structure, township-based leadership and economic status. As Freund (1995,
84) points out, Phoenix was ‘less successful [than Chatsworth] because it is
newer, because it emerged at a time when economic growth was starting to
falter seriously, and because its population tended to be poorer from the
outset’.
Maggie Govender, then a young activist from Chatsworth, points to the impor-
tance of these organizations. She notes that the CHAC ‘took up a whole range of
community issues, ranging from the sale of houses, rent struggles, discriminatory
rates’. The CHAC also had a political element to it. Its slogan, ‘Houses, Security
and Comfort’ was ‘straight out of the Freedom Charter’. Govender believes that
housing struggles in sub-economic areas
increased [residents’] political understanding of what was going on. People like Mrs
Naicker, Mrs Reddy, ordinary women who were at home, would get onto a public platform,
and talk and they commanded tremendous support. It was a good period to build grassroots
leadership.
A. DESAI AND G. VAHED
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Vawda also noted the impact of the campaigns in Phoenix:
Sometimes it would be the very first time that women would have an opportunity to speak . . .
the women came to the fore. There were some very colourful characters. I remember Mrs
Maharaj and some elderly gentlemen, Mr Luke Naidoo, Mr J.M. Singh, who then became
the Chairperson of the Phoenix Working Committee, Mr Jackie Nair; who were really
people who came in who had very difficult lives, who struggled, working people, but who
saw the need to become involved in sort of organising.
The NIC gave impetus to the formation of Durban Housing Action committee
(DHAC). At a meeting convened by the NIC on 29 March 1980 to discuss
rental increases and high rates, 20 housing committees, including those from
Phoenix, Newlands East, Merebank, Chatsworth, Cato Manor, Asherville and
Sydenham Heights joined forces to form DHAC. D. K. Singh was elected chair-
man, with Virgil Bonhomme and Pravin Gordhan as joint secretaries (Natal
Mercury, April 1, 1980). Pressure from DHAC caused the Council to postpone
rental and rates increases. Civics portrayed this as a great victory in widely dis-
tributed pamphlets (Post, August 30, 1980). The reason that housing became such
a crucial arena of struggle was that the extended family had been destroyed by the
end of the 1970s and was, as Freund put it, just ‘a cultural idea, an idiom, . . . but
it lacked physical substance’ (Freund 1995, 86). This meant that, in a context of
economic contraction, families could no longer share costs such as rent. There
was thus a need for more housing, but also cheaper housing, which became a
bare necessity. For families used to cheap survival on the urban peripheries
such as Tin Town and Cato Manor, where transport costs were minimal, con-
stantly increasing rents and service delivery charges imposed by a state
seeking to recover its costs, as well as higher transport costs, were a massive
blow.
These activities did not go unnoticed by the state. For example, Yunus
Mahomed and Pravin Gordhan were arrested and held incommunicado in late
1981. Gordhan lost his job as a pharmacist at King Edward VIII Hospital
(Natal Mercury, January 9, 1982). Other members of the NIC executive who
were imprisoned or banned in 1983 included A. S. Chetty, R. Ramesar and
George Sewpersadh.
Mobilization against rent and service delivery hikes brought the masses into the
more general political struggle against the state and facilitated cross-racial (mainly
Coloured and Indian) campaigns. It also gave NIC activists a toehold in the town-
ships and credibility because they were addressing bread-and-butter issues of
immediate concern to the working classes. Political changes during this period
provided an added impetus for mobilization.
The anti-SAIC campaign (1981) and protests against the Tricameral Dispensa-
tion (1983) created further momentum for the NIC. The first SAIC elections were
held on 4 November 1981. The NIC, which for a time wavered about participating
in the elections, eventually decided to boycott the SAIC and carried out an exten-
sive campaign through the anti-SAIC committee which stressed that the SAIC and
Local Affairs Committees (LACs) were puppets of the government and yielded
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little benefit to the masses. The turnout for the elections was around 10% (Leader,
November 13, 1981). As Murray (1987, 206) points out:
The 1981 national Anti-SAIC conference held in October in Durban was not only a water-
shed for coalition-building politics but also prefigured the formation of the UDF (United
Democratic Front). The 109 organisations represented pledged their ‘non-participation in
any constitutional arrangement that does not arise out of a national convention’ and declared
unswerving support for the principles contained in the Freedom Charter.
Opposition to its schemes did not deter the government of P. W. Botha to push
ahead with constitutional reforms that divided parliament into three racially sep-
arate chambers: one for Indians, one for whites and one for Coloureds. African
political representation was confined to the Bantustans. The system ensured that
whites always had a majority, a point consistently hammered home by the NIC.
For example, in its statement on constitutional reforms in February 1982, the
NIC noted that government-created bodies were ‘offered merely as a sop to the
aspirations of the black people. [They] have no real power . . . and will continue
to be rejected by the realists’ (Cape Argus, February 25, 1982). The anti-SAIC
campaign was central to inspiring the UDF, which was launched on 20–21
August 1983 in Cape Town.
Widening the struggle
The Wilson Rowntree boycott (1981), RMC of 1980, Anti-Republic Celebrations
Campaign of 1981, the formation of the UDF in 1983 and its million signature
campaign (MSC, 1984), the launch of the Congress of South African Trade
Union (COSATU) in 1985 and the tenth anniversary of the Soweto Rebellion
(1986) all served to deepen local struggles and facilitate the development that
was later referred to as the MDM. The RMC was organized to publicize the
plight of political prisoners and indirectly gave voice to the ANC. It also gave
NIC activists a chance to work across racial divides (Leader, May 2, 1980).
The decision to push for a broad united front was taken formally at a Transvaal
Indian Congress (TIC) conference in January 1983. One of the reasons cited for
this move was an address to South Africans by ANC President Oliver Tambo
on 8 January 1983 in which he called for the masses to organize into a powerful
mass democratic organization (Barrell 1993, 285). By now, some within the NIC,
such as Pravin Gordhan, were in contact with the ANC and embraced this call
(Barrell 1993, 285), a call echoed by the guest speaker at the TIC conference,
the Reverend Allan Boesak. The UDF’s launch in March 1983 was preceded by
intensive preparation in which NIC and TIC members played key roles. Farouk
Meer recalls that the immediate aim was to coordinate a challenge to the tricam-
eral elections which were set for August 1984. The regional UDF structures in
Natal were formally constituted on 14 May 1983 and included three NIC
members.1
This marked a strategic shift within the NIC which now formally allied itself to
a national political organization that went beyond its ethnic base. It may be argued
A. DESAI AND G. VAHED
6
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r G
oo
lam
 V
ah
ed
] a
t 0
5:2
8 1
7 J
un
e 2
01
5 
that, while some of the campaigns that followed had a national profile, this would
be to the detriment of its grassroots organization within its core support base
among the Indian masses. It may further be argued that support for the NIC did
not automatically translate into support for the UDF, although there was respect
for those individuals involved in the UDF. At the same time, these were heady
days for NIC activists as they had a greater sense of working in tandem with Afri-
cans and moving beyond the confines of greater Durban. However, it would
appear that they were aware of the need to carry the community with them as a
crucial debate inside the UDF illustrated.
This debate had its precursor in earlier times in the NIC, when it was
announced that the SAIC would be a fully elected body. Some in the NIC
called for participation. It was the issue of participation that once more
raised its head. The state had announced that it would hold a national referen-
dum to test whites’ opinion on the new constitutional proposals and that it was
also considering a referendum among Indians and Coloureds. The NIC and
TIC argued for participation (Murray 1987, 219). This represented recognition
that they needed to connect with their base inside the community they pur-
ported to represent, hoping through this to create momentum in any future
move to hold tricameral elections. Other UDF affiliates, like the SAAWU,
argued that given that Africans were excluded from the proposals, a referen-
dum should be boycotted. A choice was avoided by the state’s decision not
to hold a referendum among Indians and Coloureds. However, as Murray
(1987, 219) points out:
Tactical differences over these issues indicated that while UDF affiliates adhered to a
common opposition to apartheid they did not possess a uniform political outlook with
respect to mounting an effective challenge. The UDF leadership was thus confronted with
the substantial task of forging a common program and a unified strategy without alienating
significant blocs of its affiliated organisations.
The UDF responded to the state’s attempt at co-optation by launching a MSC
against apartheid and the tricameral elections in early 1984. While the target
was not met, the rallies and home visits by students and volunteers helped to
mobilize the masses against the new dispensation. The lead-up to the first elections
on 20 August 1984 was used to commemorate the first anniversary of the UDF and
the 90th of the NIC. Voter turnout was around 20% among Indians (Leader,
August 24, 1984). The UDF saw this as a victory for its boycott campaign and
the NIC as a vindication of its move into the UDF. As Howarth (2005, 205–
206) points out, the UDF became a rallying point
for the unification and symbolic condensation of a number of disparate struggles . . . .The
UDF’s symbolic significance stretched further than its more narrow organisational profile
suggested . . . . Although it would be inaccurate to argue that the UDF co-ordinated and
directed the explosion of mass resistance against the state in its various manifestations . . .
the existence of such a political force, especially given the national prominence it had
achieved in opposing the government’s reform programme, undoubtedly fuelled and accel-
erated mass protest.
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For the NIC, while its transition into the UDF saw it break out of an ethnic enclave,
‘national’ politics became a big part of the leadership’s work and attempts to build
local branches took a backseat.
State repression
The tricameral system was Botha’s attempt to broaden the political system to
include Indians and Coloureds as junior partners while narrowing the boundaries
of dissent. Alongside this, the Bantustan system was designed in such a way that
Africans would supposedly exercise their rights in these ‘tribally’ circumscribed
areas. Rather than heading off resistance, the tricameral system stirred country-
wide mobilization. The state turned to its old repressive ways and began to
detain UDF activists. Thirty-five UDF/NIC leaders were arrested on 21 August
1984, a week before the elections, and charged under the Internal Security Act
(Rand Daily Mail, August 29, 1984). A court application by the NIC resulted in
the release of the detainees on 7 September but the Special Branch secured new
orders for their re-arrest.
In a dramatic move that seemed to catch the state off-guard, six of the UDF/NIC
members, Archie Gumede, George Sewpersadh, Mewa Ramgobin, M. J. Naidoo,
Billy Nair and Paul David, took refuge in the British Consulate in Durban on 14
September 1984. Sewpersadh, Nair and Ramgobin left the Consulate on 6 October
and were re-arrested (The Citizen, November 1, 1984). Farouk Meer was tasked
with attending to the medical needs of those in the Consulate and was a conduit
between them and the outside world. According to one newspaper report, a con-
sular official was present to ensure that Meer only discussed medical issues
while Ursula David claimed that the consulate was holding back letters to their
husbands and had banned all visits to the Consulate (The Citizen, November 12,
1984). Facing international pressure, the government withdrew its detention
notices and Gumede, David and Nair were welcomed back by more than 6000
people on 12 December 1984 (Leader, December 21, 1984). Reflecting on this
episode in 1990, M. J. Naidoo wrote that
it is axiomatic that the 1984 British Consulate ‘sit-in’ by the NIC brought international focus
to the evils of the apartheid system and the repressive security laws. It gave new impetus to
anti-apartheid groups both locally and abroad, and renewed calls for the release of Nelson
Mandela and other leaders reverberated throughout the progressive world. (Natal Witness,
May 22, 1990)
While this is indeed the case, such high-profile moments in which NIC leaders
were prominent did not necessarily translate into building mass support for the
organization within the Indian community. In fact, the detention of leaders
might have alienated many in the community which itself was going through pro-
found changes. More and more graduates were coming out of UD-W, building
houses in middle-class areas like Reservoir Hills and generally improving their
status as a professional class. Furthermore, it also meant a loss of opportunity
to strengthen township branches.
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Freedom was short-lived for those who escaped the Consulate. Within days, the
government re-arrested five of those who had originally holed up in the Consulate
and made a number of additional arrests in February 1986. In all, 16 activists were
charged with treason in what came to be known as the Pietermaritzburg Treason
Trial.2 The state’s case was weak and charges against 12 of the accused were
dropped in December 1985 and those against the remaining four in June of
1986. Although the state lacked a sound case, the accused spent almost a year
in prison (see Catholic Institute for International Relations 1985).
Another restrictive measure was the state of emergency that the government
declared on 21 July 1985. This was a particularly difficult period for the hundreds
of activists who were arrested, such as Maggie Govender who described her June
1986 arrest as
a major eye-opener in the community because the police came heavily armed. They sur-
rounded the school with military vehicles. This was June 17th. I remember it was the [police-
man] jumped up and said ‘you are arrested under the State of Emergency’. I had a Head of
Department who was progressive, Rex Aiyer, and he went to the staff to say this is what hap-
pened. Two of the children ran to a relative’s home to tell them. This is important [because]
while this was happening the police were sending people to my home [so] my mother-in-law
burnt everything that looked political and my husband [Charm] had come home, they told
him to leave. My son was one year and one month and he was breastfed. They didn’t
allow me access to my son. His breast-feeding had to stop. I was kept in solitary confinement.
After three months and a few weeks I was released without charge.
Hundreds of lives were affected through the use of this deliberate strategy.
However, the UDF continued to act as a lightning rod for protest and threw up
new layers of leadership.
Resistance underground—Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)
Within the Indian community, a small number of activists were attracted to MK
from the late 1970s and formed an underground command structure in Durban.
Their planned operation, code-named Operation Butterfly, was overseen by Ivan
Pillay, who, in turn, was under the command of Jacob Zuma, and included the
likes of Pravin Gordhan, Mo Shaik, Yunus Shaik, Abba Omar and Vejay Ramla-
kan (see Houston 2010).
What would come to be known as the ‘Lenny Naidu Unit’ was formed towards
the end of 1984 in Chatsworth by young activists such as Lenny Naidu, Derek
Naidoo and Richard Vallihu. Two operations were carried out in Chatsworth. A
limpet mine was placed outside the home of politician, Amichand Rajbansi on
4 August 1985, while the magistrate’s court was bombed on 13 December
1985. The cell was unravelled within months when a member of the unit was
arrested. Lenny Naidu (1964–1988), after whom the unit was named, went into
exile in February 1987, first to Lusaka, then to Angola for military training and
to Swaziland in May 1988. On 8 June 1988, Lenny Naidu, Lindiwe Mthembu,
Makhosi Nyoka and Nontsikelelo Cothoza were gunned down on the road
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between Houtkop and Piet Retief while seeking to cross the border into South
Africa (Neela and Leo Naidu 2002).
The break-up of the Bayview cell did not put an end to underground activity.
Yunus Shaik and his brothers, Mo and Chippie, were also detained for their
role in the underground in Durban. At the Kabwe Conference of 1985, the
ANC decided to intensify the armed struggle and sent Ebrahim into the country
to assess the situation. After Ebrahim had spent about six months in the
country, taken care of by the Shaik brothers, preparations were made for him
to leave. Ebrahim escaped, but Mo and Yunus Shaik were detained for nine
months from June 1985 to March 1986, while Chippie was detained for 18
months.
Some of the activists were involved in Operation Vula, a secret project initiated
by Mac Maharaj, Oliver Tambo, Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo, following the
ANC National Executive Committee’s 1986 decision to bring arms into the
country and create political awareness about the ANC. Maharaj entered South
Africa in August 1988 for this purpose. He recruited a number of NIC activists.
The ANC was already in negotiations with key government and white capital
figures but was also hedging its bets by preparing for the eventuality of a pro-
tracted armed struggle. Operation Vula was active mainly in Natal between
August 1988 and May 1990 and provided logistical support for the war in
KwaZulu-Natal. Forty people, including Pravin Gordhan and Billy Nair, were
arrested in July 1990 (O’ Malley 2007, 349–386).
These activities show that a number of NIC activists were involved in the under-
ground structures of the ANC and MK despite the fact that at the public level the
NIC held fast to its Gandhian principles of non-violence. This activity meant that
there was a great deal of secrecy; this created tensions in the public work of the
NIC as it appeared to some that they were being left out of discussions. Further-
more, the tight grouping of Indians in the ANC underground gave them privileged
access to exile politics and this increased antagonism towards them from some
African comrades. To complicate matters further, different underground group-
ings began to align themselves with different groups in exile, exacerbating
tensions.
Liberation struggles are untidy and full of contradictions, with personalities jos-
tling for power and tensions between the legal and illegal. Much of this came to
bear inside the NIC.
The ‘cabal’
The NIC was not a tight grouping of activists that read from the same script. It was
replete with factions, leadership splits and contestations over tactics and strategies.
Charm Govender recalled a secret October 1987 workshop at the Aryan Benevo-
lent Home (ABH) in Chatsworth where the NIC top brass conceded that the organ-
ization had failed to muster grassroots support. According to Naidoo (1997),
criticisms of the leadership at this meeting included the NIC’s failure to
become a mass-based organization as a result of its failure to develop properly
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functioning branches in Chatsworth and Phoenix which rendered the organization
ineffective when leaders were arrested; the failure to adopt a clear programme and
instead to react to issues; and, the continued dominance of leadership by middle-
class professionals, now joined by university students.
While many of the leaders of the UDF were NIC members, many Indians saw
the UDF as a militant organization whose culture of confrontation led by African
students was something they could not identify with. According to Naidoo, one of
the accusations that emerged at this workshop was that a cabal that sought to mar-
ginalize old activists by influencing the election of officials determined the NIC’s
policy-making. Charm Govender also pointed to ‘factionalism comprising essen-
tially of a Pravin Gordhan apparatus and a Roy Padayachie apparatus’. He
believes that this may have had its origins in the leaders’ contact with different
ANC factions in exile while, locally, Gordhan was influential in Phoenix and
Padayachie in Chatsworth. Charm described these divisions as ‘very sharp and
took the form even of antagonism and disrespect’. There were accusations,
according to Charm, of ‘cabal’s operating . . . groups meeting in secret, groups
trying to engage in machinations against each other. It had a destructive effect
because you dislocated the struggle to how to make sure that the influence of
the other was reduced’. Local newspapers reported regularly on NIC ‘cabals’.
The origins of the allegations and subsequent divisions are clouded by who one
speaks to but essentially it appears that members with their base in Chatsworth
were jostling for control with the old entrenched middle-class professional elite
from the city.
Matters came to a head at the NIC’s November 1988 conference when
M. J. Naidoo, who was president, Rabi Bugwandeen, R. Ramesar and
R. B. Chaudhray, was ousted from the executive. Yunus Carrim told reporters
that the conference showed that the NIC was paralysed ideologically, its structures
were undemocratic, its leadership disunited and that there were personality con-
flicts. He called for the youth to be given leadership positions (Natal Mercury,
December 25, 1987). In a letter to the Daily News (January 14, 1988), ‘NIC Fem-
inist, Merebank’ also bemoaned the fact that the executive was dominated by
men.3 M. J. Naidoo told The Weekly Mail (January 29, 1988) that ‘the election
was a sham. I am talking about six or seven people who in the past referred to
themselves as the “think tank”’. Farouk Meer refuted the allegations and stated
that decisions were made by the NIC’s Organizing Committee, which consisted
of 50 members. One of the resolutions passed at this conference was that
‘members of the House of Delegates and their allies have no political future in
South Africa and should meet the same fate as collaborators in other social
struggles: public isolation and social disgrace’. History, of course, would prove
otherwise.
According to Kumi Naidoo, the working class South Indians and younger acti-
vists in Chatsworth and Phoenix felt that they were marginalized while the old
elite carried on as if it was ‘business as usual’ on the one hand. On the other
hand, the old-elite executive argued that the closing of space for political organ-
ization and outright repression meant that it had to operate in secrecy (Naidoo
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1997). While not referring to a cabal, Bhana (1997, 148) also points to the NIC’s
organizational shortcomings:
In the last few years its structures remained too centralised, and its leadership much too
removed from the rank and file to build a base of mass support. Having to answer to an
ill-defined, loose constituency of supporters, the leaders did not face the rigours of account-
ability. They tended, therefore, to impose from above, rather than structure from below
through the medium of ‘town hall’ type meetings.
Members of this so-called cabal would pay a price once the ANC was unbanned. A
confidential 1990 ANC report noted Indian and White dominance of the UDF:
‘The problems of disunity within the ranks of the MDM due to the manipulating
role of certain Indians and Whites regarded as leaders in the struggle, has reached
a level of such seriousness that it is clear that we need to address it immediately
and decisively’. It recommended a strategy ‘aimed at isolating certain individuals
and at the same time undermining their power base. Our aim should be to make
them feel comfortable in their positions while we prepare to finally rid our struc-
tures of them’.4 With specific regard to Natal, part of the explanation for tensions
between the ANC and UDF was that in the African townships the ANC did not
rebuild its base on UDF structures, but with those involved in the ANC in the
1950s and that this was based on the fusion of civics and MK structures
(Francis 2011, 53–54).
There were a number of crosscutting issues at play in terms of NIC membership.
Some members were part of the ANC underground, acted in secrecy and gravi-
tated to one another; some older members were probably more comfortable
working within the Indian community and holding the line against collaboration;
and others were ‘political animals’, who quickly entered the ANC and stepped
onto a bigger stage for their activism. The organizational culture bred in these cir-
cumstances made it easy to both act as a grouping and be accused of acting like a
cabal. Whatever the case, Jerry Coovadia points to the price paid by some named
as part of this so-called cabal:
There was a lot of criticism of the UDF that it was believed that there were too many
Indians mostly, some whites, that controlled it. And there was also a perception that
there was a cabal of Indians who controlled both the direction and resources of the
UDF. That led to a lot of differences between the returning ANC, the Trade Union Move-
ment and the UDF. Those of us who were Indian in the UDF paid a price. As the branches
of the UDF fell away and new branches of the ANC were created many of us, let me speak
for myself, I was too deeply wounded to participate in an organisation where my bona fides
were being questioned. I wasn’t the same sort of political animal that many of my col-
leagues were, who could take that political heat, because you need a special make-up to
participate in the cut and thrust of political affairs. It wasn’t that I withdrew willingly.
My sensitivities were so deeply wounded having to fight off these types of accusations
which are deeply racist. I had participated in the struggle because . . . my conscience told
me it was the right thing to do and it was my innate sense of wanting freedom for all
our people, that’s what drove me. I didn’t make money out of it, in fact, it kept my
career back.5
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While the issues festered and were to be carried over into post-apartheid South
Africa, circumstances made these accusations less and less important. While criti-
cism of the NIC for failing to establish branches in the townships is valid, it only
partly accounts for the failure to get the Indian masses to support the ANC after
1990. Indian fears of the African majority were real and influenced the behaviour
of the mass of Indians as South Africa headed towards non-racialism. A crucial
reminder to Indians of their vulnerability was the outbreak of violence in
Inanda in 1985.
Inanda violence, 1985
Attempts to forge broadbased resistance, tenuous at the best of times, suffered a
major setback as a result of the August 1985 racial violence in Inanda, a township
north of Durban that adjoins the Phoenix Settlement established by Gandhi in
1903 (Hughes 1987). Demonstrations in townships across Durban following the
assassination of UDF activist Victoria Mxenge turned into attacks on Indians in
Inanda, many of whom were evicted from their homes, while Indian-owned
shops were looted and destroyed and the Phoenix Settlement burnt down.6 This
incident attracted international attention and was portrayed as racial violence.
Indians and Africans lived in close proximity in Inanda which served as a
toehold for many Africans who worked in the city and many of whom relied on
Indian landlords for accommodation and purchased goods from Indian shop-
keepers. The Inanda violence must be seen in this context. At the same time,
the form that it took identified Indians as targets. Besides the general political con-
frontation, a number of interests coalesced that saw the removal of Indians as ben-
eficial, including African landlords and shopkeepers.
However one seeks to understand the 1985 Inanda attacks on the ground, the
festering memory of the 1949 Indo-Africans riots touched a raw nerve among
many Indians who saw this as a ‘racial’ attack despite activists’ efforts to under-
play the racial dimension (see Edwards and Nuttall 1990).
Furthermore, while apartheid increasingly hemmed Indians into racially cir-
cumscribed areas on the outer edges of the city, it did foster economic mobility.
The period after 1960 was witness to increased educational opportunities at the
ML Sultan Technikon, UD-W and Springfield Teacher Training College, young
women entering the workforce, particularly in the clothing and textile industries
and the rise of artisan and professional classes as new careers opportunities
opened up in engineering, accounting, architecture and a host of other fields.
Indians also moved up in the ranks of the civil service as the LACs, SAIC and
House of Delegates opened new doors and more schools and improved chances
for promotion.7 The role of ethnic politics, notwithstanding the low voter
turnout during elections, was important as people like Amichand Rajbansi had a
visible presence in the Indian townships where they developed a specific power
base which promoted ethnic and racial identity and which became apparent
post-1994.
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As the NIC sought to build structures on ground as an anti-apartheid force
seeking majority rule, this inevitably created challenges for the organization.
This was made all the more difficult in the aftermath of the Inanda violence as
its platform of non-racialism seemed to have limited purchase; indeed, some
might even argue that it exacerbated tensions between Africans and Indians as
the NIC was identified with attacks on people such as Chief Buthelezi (Desai
1996, 85). According to Naidoo (1997), the riots ‘exposed the serious organis-
ational weaknesses of the NIC. Its leadership was distant from the people affected
by the riots, and it had no influence or grassroots presence in the area that could
calm anxieties’. Conversely, the assistance provided by Rajbansi and the House
of Delegates to refugees, increased their standing not only with many of the
affected Indians but also with the broader community schooled in memories of
1949 and the expulsion of Ugandan Asians by Idi Amin.
The Daily News’ political correspondent, Graham Spence noted that whereas
the turnout for the tricameral elections in 1984 had been 6% there was a 38%
turnout in a by-election in 1988. While the NIC argued that the banning, imprison-
ment and exile of leaders during the state of emergency meant that it could not
carry out mass campaigns against the elections, Spence observed that the NIC
failed on one basic issue—that of allaying the insular Indian community’s fears of group
security if an African majority were in power. Many Indians tacitly support the Group
Areas—not necessarily because of racism, but rather a fear of being swamped by blacks.
These fears were fuelled significantly by the 1985 Inanda Riots and the New Year’s Day
racial incidents on the former Indian beach last year. (Daily News, January 6, 1988)
Surveys also pointed to a social distance between Indians and Africans (Horowitz
1991, 82). An April 1987 study by Markinor found that 53% of Indians worried
‘really often’ or ‘quite often’ while 27% worried ‘sometimes’ that Africans
would again attack Indians and 53% ‘strongly disagreed’ that Indians would be
safe under the African majority rule (Jeffrey 1989, 6). A 1992 survey by the
Human Sciences Research Council found that over 70% of Indians would
support the NP while a mere 12% supported the ANC (Post, April 15–18,
1992). A July 1990 survey of Durban’s Indians found that 63% were in favour
of segregated neighbourhoods and schools (Charney 1991, 26). As the first demo-
cratic elections loomed so did many Indians’ fears of majority rule increase.
Non-racial democracy and the future of the NIC
The unbanning of the ANC and other political organizations by former President
F. W. de Klerk when opening Parliament on 2 February 1990 marked a major
moment in South African political history. The ANC and NP were forced to the
negotiating table as a result of the changing global and local situation. This
included the thawing of the Cold War, collapse of Communist governments, res-
olution of the Namibian struggle, change of leadership within the government, the
economic and social impact of sanctions and a changed sense on all sides as to
what was possible (Lieberfeld 2000, 19–20).
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As the transition to democracy unfolded, questions were asked about the nature
and composition of extra-parliamentary opposition. This included debates about
the continued existence of the NIC and the UDF. For most of 1990 there was a
talk of the UDF redefining its focus to concentrate on socio-economic issues
while the ANC focused on political negotiations. By early 1991 it was clear
that the UDF was redundant and it formally disbanded in August 1991. According
to Seekings (2000b, 261),
the UDF was dissolved not by design on the part of the top leadership, but because of the
breadth and depth of opposition and even hostility to the UDF leadership and the UDF as
a co-ordinating body. Diverse groups within the broad Charterist movement saw the UDF
as the vehicle of leaders whom they did not like and who, they were pretty sure, did not
like them either—as a body which pursued strategies and tactics that they disapproved of,
and which controlled resources that should be reallocated elsewhere.
In the heady days of the unbanning of the ANC and the setting of branch struc-
tures, many in the UDF joined the organization that had inspired them through
the long apartheid years. These were the years when the language changed from
defiance to development, from ‘ungovernability’ to ‘ready to govern’ and the
ANC had to show that it could exercise control and produce stability. UDF
leaders had to contend with returning exiles with their own networks and camar-
aderie. The homegrown leadership mostly gave way. COSATU followed the lead
of the ANC while civics too quickly became the embryos of ANC branches. In this
sense, the UDF simply faded away as most of its supporters inexorably filtered
into the ANC (Seekings 2000b, 283). Others have argued that the UDF’s
demise was a deliberate move by the ANC, as it sought to rein in any discordant
voices in a period in which it sought to reach an accord with the NP (Bond and
Saul 2014).
However, the NIC enjoyed a slightly longer shelf life. Differences of opinion
emerged within the NIC about its future. Mewa Ramgobin, who was vice-presi-
dent of the NIC, told Sechaba Magazine in April 1990 that the unbanning of
the ANC meant that ‘there may be a limited lifespan for the NIC, especially
as the democratic movement is now seeking to build non-racial constituencies
for the creation of a future non-racial, democratic and united South Africa’ (Ram-
gobin 1990, 8). He told reporter Nicola Cunningham-Brown that to lead Indians
into a non-racial democracy it was ‘essential to have unity in action—direct par-
ticipation through membership of the ANC’. Ramgobin warned, however, that the
government and the media had presented the ANC as ‘the bad guy’ which made it
‘difficult to recruit Indians to the organisation’. Farouk Meer also said that the NIC
would be disbanded after it had completed its task of acting as the facilitator for
the ANC in establishing a presence in the Indian townships (Daily News, May 11,
1990). NIC executive member, Yunus Carrim echoed this when he said that the
NIC would not ‘mechanically disband’ but would ‘phase out so that its dissolution
is part of an overall campaign that ensures that a significant strata of the Indian
community is drawn into the ANC’ (Natal Witness, May 12, 1990). This reflected
recognition among some activists of the genuine fears among many Indians about
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majority rule and that, given the effects of apartheid which fostered division, the
community could be brought into the fold of the ANC through the midwifery of
the NIC.
M. J. Naidoo, who had been ousted as NIC president in 1988, called on the NIC
to stop prevaricating on disbanding. People were sceptical of the dithering ‘vibes
emanating from the NIC ranks, such as the NIC should disband, the NIC should
phase itself out (whatever that means), the NIC structures are debating the
issue’. He warned that endemic violence in African townships which was spilling
over into Indian areas was heightening fears among Indians, and that working
under the ‘umbrella’ of the ANC would ‘alleviate the tensions and remove their
[Indian] fears. The NIC, as NIC, cannot play a role in this regard’ (Natal
Witness, May 22, 1990).
A joint meeting of the NIC and TIC in June 1990 recommended that the organ-
izations disband and join the ANC. Mewa Ramgobin explained that this would
strengthen the hand of the ANC at the negotiating table (Financial Mail, June
11, 1990). This decision was reversed when the national executives of the NIC
and TIC met with an ANC delegation which included its internal leader, Walter
Sisulu, South African Communist Party (SACP) general secretary, Joe Slovo, sec-
retary general, Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, who was head of internal communi-
cations, and southern Natal chairman Jacob Zuma, at UD-W on 17 March 1993.
They resolved that the NIC and TIC should not disband but use their structures
to mobilize support for the ANC. This was an acknowledgement that the ANC
had to address that fears of minorities (Daily News, March 18, 1991). Reporter
Veven Bissetty described the announcement as a ‘bombshell’ in a context
where the UDF was disbanding. The ANC Youth League was also critical of
the decision and issued a statement that
no ethnic or racial group, no matter how well intentioned, should ethnically prepare itself to
join the ANC. The League views the decision as a strategic error that might lead to polariz-
ation of the national liberation forces. It is our view that more effort should be concentrated
towards building the ANC into a cohesive and truly non-racial movement. (Natal Mercury,
March 21, 1991)
Farouk Meer of the NIC countered that disbanding or continuing the NIC was
not the main issue; rather, their concern was that with South Africa undergoing
rapid political transformation they wanted to find ‘ways and means to mobilize
the different sectors of the community. We are looking at the best method to
mobilize the Indian community, either to become members of the ANC or,
failing that, to support its policies’. The NIC wanted to win Indians to the
side of the ANC rather than recruit members (Natal Mercury, March 21,
1991).
The ANC held its first full conference in South Africa since 1959 at UD-W from
2 to 6 July 1991. Nelson Mandela was formally elected ANC president at this con-
ference. The future role of the NIC was debated. Delegates accepted that the
organization was an anachronism and that they had to start a phasing out
process but only after they helped to muster support for the ANC in the run-up
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to the elections. An NIC/TIC delegation, consisting of Farouk Meer, Yusuf Vawda
and Pravin Gordhan attended the preparatory meeting for the Convention of a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991. They worked closely
with the ANC and attended their caucus meetings. They were also represented
in the working groups. A joint NIC/TIC delegation was also represented in the
steering committee for organizing CODESA 1, which became the management
committee after CODESA 1. There was a lull in negotiations until the March
1992 white referendum gave the NP the mandate to continue negotiations.
CODESA 2 followed between April and August 1992. Despite several setbacks
which threatened to derail negotiations, Booysen (1992, 76) shows that by
October 1992 ‘the ANC was in the process of achieving basic democratic con-
ditions. In the course of 1992 especially, the Government lost its ability to seize
the initiative in the transition process’. CODESA was to culminate in the country’s
first non-racial elections in 1994.
The NIC’s failure to disband was a concession that Indian support for the
ANC could not be taken for granted. In fact, the NIC’s throwing its lot
behind the ANC did not result in the Indian masses following suit. M. J.
Naidoo had a point when he wrote in 1990 that ‘in the past five years . . .
oppressed South Africa has literally been on the march. The Indian community
has not kept step with it’ (Natal Witness, May 22, 1990); although it could be
argued that even in the previous two decades, except for a small rump,
Indians were wary of what lay ahead. Caught between the economically domi-
nant whites and numerically powerful Africans, it seemed that many Indians felt
extremely vulnerable. Working-class Indians in particular were apprehensive of
the African majority rule and seemed to fear that just as apartheid had denied
them opportunities; they would be marginalized by affirmative action. In Chats-
worth, long-time activist Charm Govender noted that before the 1994 elections
he could ‘see the community displaying a lot of unease about having majority
rule and they then, in the election, reflected this unease by voting in a significant
majority for the National Party (NP)’. Sam Pillay, another ANC stalwart,
pointed out that ANC members ‘spent a lot of time and effort spreading the
word about the ANC but it was very difficult to break the thinking of the
Indian people’.
Critics would argue that the ANC failed to address Indians’ genuine fears and
concerns. In contrast, despite the low turnout for the tricameral elections and
being the subject of ridicule by the NIC, Amichand Rajbansi enjoyed support
among working-class Indians. He formed the Minority Front (MF) that
focused exclusively on the interests of Indians. His simple and powerful
message was that he understood their concerns and would speak up for them.
Nationally, large numbers of Indians voted for the NP in the April 1994 elec-
tions. While it is impossible to isolate the Indian vote nationally, the results of
the Chatsworth electoral area show that at the provincial level 19.42% of eligible
voters cast their vote for the MF and 44.6% for the NP; at the national level
64.32% of Chatsworth voters cast their vote for the NP (Desai 1996, 87). This
does not mean that they supported the white minority rule but it reflected their
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own fears and concerns about the future. The fact that the NIC failed to deliver
for the ANC made the case of those supporting its continued existence much
more difficult. Exacerbating this was the move by some in the ANC to seek
an alliance with Rajbansi.
The NIC celebrated its 100th anniversary in 1994, within months of the elec-
tion, and debated its continued existence. Was there a role for the NIC in a dera-
cialized South Africa? Should the organization drop the ‘I’ to give meaning to the
idea of non-racialism? Dr K. Goonam, vice president of the NIC in the 1940s,
argued that ‘now it is time to let go. It [the NIC] failed miserably in mobilising
Indian support for the ANC in the April election. People just no longer have
any faith in the organisation’ (Leader, August 26, 1994). Others disagreed.
Abdul Randeree, a long-time official, felt that the ‘the movement still has a
vital role to play, even in politics, and can make a valuable contribution to
society if future’ (Leader, August 26, 1994). Many Indians were reluctant to let
go of their ties to this racially exclusive organization.
Marlan Padayachee of the Post (December 7–10, 1994) asked: ‘Has the NIC
reached a cul-de-sac?’ Many felt that in the view of the peaceful transition to a
non-racial democracy, the NIC should cease functioning as a political party
without mass support and ‘leave the political scene on a high note in its
history 100th anniversary year’. A number of NIC members served in the
country’s first non-racial parliament. Ela Gandhi, Mewa Ramgobin, Pravin
Gordhan, Yunus Carrim and Billy Nair were in the National Assembly while
Ismail Meer was in the KZN Provincial Legislature. Just 150 people turned
up for the NIC’s march through Grey Street (now Yusuf Dadoo Street) to cele-
brate its 100th anniversary and there was a poor turnout at the KwaMuhle
Museum. Thus, journalist Padayachee concluded that, the NIC had reached a
‘cul-de-sac’.
Opinion was divided among NIC members canvassed by reporter Padayachee.
Roy Padayachie, Dr K. Goonam, M. J. Naidoo, J. N. Singh and Billy Nair felt that
the organization should disband. Padayachie suggested that the NIC should relin-
quish its political role and instead become a ‘vehicle for the cultural enhancement
and development of the community. It can also play a monitoring role to ensure
that the community is making progress in integrating itself with the emerging
new South Africa’. M. J. Naidoo’s brother M. D. Naidoo, Thumba Pillay and
Hassim Seedat, among others, felt that it would be premature to disband. M. D.
Naidoo said that ‘the time has not arrived for the NIC to fold. The Indian, who
is in the minority, must jealously guard against the failure to implement a non-
racial policy that the ANC was party to since the 1940s’. Thumba Pillay felt
that the country was just six months into transition and that it was ‘too early to
determine the future of an organisation that had served the cause of democracy
for a century’. The NIC could ‘articulate the aspirations of the community and
address its fears and concerns’. Ironically, MF leader, Amichand Rajbansi,
assured Indians that they were ‘safe and secure’ under President Nelson
Mandela. In fact, the NIC never formally disbanded but simply faded into the
folds of history.
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Conclusion
‘Indianness’ was constructed from the late nineteenth century in South Africa
through a combination of state policies as well as self-identification. The NIC’s
racial exclusivity for long periods of its history possibly buttressed racial identi-
ties. Its attempts to forge a broad Black political alliance in the 1950s were
derailed by the incarceration of leaders and spatial segregation and material
inequalities under apartheid that increased social distance between Indians and
Africans. Neither Black Consciousness in the 1970s, nor the resurgence in
working class organization in the 1970s and 1980s nor the non-racialism of the
Congress tradition forged a non-racial identity. Indeed, many Indians were con-
cerned about the possible consequences of the majority rule.
Thomas Blom Hansen’s assessment that post-Soweto-1976, ‘the vast majority
of Indians embraced the notion that the community was indeed their actual
horizon for any political action’ (Hansen 2012, 294) has much resonance.
Indians were mobilized in the 1980s over issues such as housing, education and
opposition to government created political structures. This drew the mass of
Indians into activism as these were bread-and-butter issues. This was not sustained
as a result of censorship, imprisonment, bans and some activists going into exile to
join the banned ANC. The NIC leaders’ decision to engage in underground ANC
activity was an important turning point as they removed themselves from the sort
of townships where they could have built on their mass support through demo-
cratic structures. At the same time, as Hansen (2012, 75) notes, township politics
was a ‘hothouse of monopolistic cronyism’ in which individuals such as Rajbansi
and his party, the MF, remained popular.
The legacy of 1949 and the 1985 Inanda violence compounded Indian fears.
Individual Indians featured prominently in the major resistance organizations
but failed to take the Indian masses with them. Many Indians feared the conse-
quences of majority rule. Historically, Indians and Africans have had a troubled
relationship. Hansen (2012, 97) describes the relationship as one of ‘apprehensive
co-existence’ in which, under the white gaze, Indians and Africans became ‘cat-
egorical strangers’. In a context where society is viewed through the prism of
race, that relationship remains marked by competition rather than interaction.
The NIC never formally disbanded. While there were occasional calls for its
revival through the 1990s, there were no real takers. Wealthier Indians have
begun to send their children to study or live abroad while they continue to live
and work in South Africa. Some working-class Indians gravitated to local civics
and neighbourhood watches to ensure that they are able to live in a secure environ-
ment and keep things ‘the same’. Some civics, especially in Chatsworth, did
develop a militant posture against evictions and water and electricity disconnec-
tions in the early 2000s but have largely buckled down to work within the
system, hoping to make incremental gains.
These developments bring to the fore the pioneering role that the NIC played in
the 1980s in taking the organization into the MDM and seeking to play a role in the
struggle to defeat apartheid and usher in the majority rule. The number of NIC
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activists may have been small but their influence was large; whatever its limit-
ations at the grassroots level the NIC did give credence to the slogan ‘Apartheid
Divides, UDF Unites’. The NIC’s links with the ANC in exile and its adoption of
the Freedom Charter meant that it kept the memory of the Congress Alliance alive
under difficult circumstances. These schools of resistance earned some in the NIC
a lofty status in the annals of liberation iconography and paved the way for them to
enter the portals of Mandela’s government. Twenty years into democracy, when
race divisions are still with us, and an assertive African nationalism sometimes
turns its torch on the ‘privileges’ of Indians in accessing state tenders, a critical
interrogation of the role of Indians in the struggle against apartheid is needed
more than ever. This article adds to existing work while encouraging further
research.
Notes
∗Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
∗∗Department of History, University of KwaZulu-Natal, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Email: vahedg@ukzn.ac.za
1. The executive committee comprised Archie Gumede (President), Jerry Coovadia (Chairperson), Virgil Bon-
homme (Vice-Chairperson), Rabbi Bugwandeen and Victoria Mxenge (Treasurers) and Yunus Mahomed
(Secretary).
2. The 16 were Mewa Ramgobin, George Sewpersadh, M. Naidoo, Essop Jassat, Aubrey Mokoena, Curtis
Nkondo, Archie Gumede, Paul David, Albertina Sisulu, Frank Chikane, Ebrahim Saloojee, Ismail
Mohamed, Richard Gqwete, Sisa Njikelana, Samuel Kikine and Isaac Ngcobo. The latter four were
members of the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) while the others were members of the
UDF/NIC/TIC.
3. As Hassim has counselled, a missing dimension in the historiography of the liberation struggle is the absence
of discussion on ‘women’s roles in the civics or of women’s organisations in alliance with the civics’ and the
need for a ‘“gender corrective” to these histories’ (Hassim 2003, 49; see also Patel 1988; Meer 1998). Given its
specific focus, this article does not examine this important dimension of the story.
4. The following individuals were identified as part of the Cabal. Natal: Pravin Gordan, Zac Yacoob, Alf Carrim,
Yunus Mohammed, Farouk Meer, Jerry Coovadia, Billy Nair, Diliza Mji, Sikhumbuzo Ngwenya, Curnick
Ndlovu; Transvaal: Ismail Momoniat, Laloo Chiba, Casim Salojee, Eric Molobi and Amos Masondo;
Western Cape: Jonathan de Vries, Hadley King, Cathy Macrae, Ebrahim Patel (‘Dullah Omar is also currently
exceeding his vested authority and seems to be part and parcel of the Cabal’); National: Azhar Cachalia,
Mohammed Valli, Murphy Morobe and Titus Mafolo. Report and Recommendations of Commission on the
Cabal, 14 March 1990, Mac Maharaj Documents and Reports, O’Malley Archives. Available online from
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv04015/5lv04154/06lv04181.htm
(accessed on 5 March, 2014).
5. When asked to probe this issue further, Professor Coovadia replied by email on 7 April 2014, ‘I neither have
the heart or the resilience to overcome my huge disappointment at the opportunism which characterised the
years of change from the NIC/UDF to the ANC.’
6. According to Hughes, this violence resulted in 2000 Indian refugees, the death of four Indians, destruction of
44 Indian businesses and many homes. Hughes points out that the casualties would have been much higher
were it not for the fact that Indians simply fled the scene of the attacks.
7. A survey in 1992–1993 revealed that Indians were much better placed relative to Africans, as they were con-
centrated in higher paying jobs. The average household income of Indians in 1991 was R2476, three times that
of Africans which was R779 (SAIRR 1993, 192). Further, whereas 49.9% of Indians earned over R2000 per
month in 1991, the proportion for Africans was only 6.8% (SAIRR 1993, 192).
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